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Launching the War on Terrorism

On the morning of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush traveled to Emma Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida. As he arrived at the school, Bush learned that a plane had crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. The President and his aides believed that a tragic accident had occurred. A few minutes later, while Bush read a story to a class of second-grade students, Andrew Card, the President's Chief of Staff, whispered into his ear: "A second plane hit the other tower, and America's under attack."¹ Bush maintained his composure and finished reading to the children. Then, he hurried out of the classroom to learn more about the events transpiring in New York. The President recalled his initial reaction to the morning's shocking developments: "I knew that I needed to be clear-headed, and I was anxious to get out of the classroom to get the facts. . . . I needed to know what it meant: 'America was under attack.'"² A short time later, when Bush learned that terrorists had apparently struck New York City, he thought: "They had declared war on us, and I made up my mind at that moment that we were going to war."³

Anger and Resolve

The President entered the school's media room and announced the startling news of an "apparent terrorist attack" on the United States.⁴ Shortly thereafter, Bush boarded Air Force One to return to Washington, D.C. He spoke with Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, who were in the underground Presidential Emergency Operations Center in Washington. Cheney argued that the military should, if necessary, fire on any additional commercial airliners hijacked by terrorists. The President agreed. Cheney and Rice also advised the President to postpone his return to Washington for safety reasons. Reluctantly, Bush heeded their advice and proceeded to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. During this very tense time, Bush told the Vice President, "We're going to find out who did this, and we're going to kick their asses."⁵

Meanwhile, the President's advisers began to write a statement for him to deliver from Louisiana. Karen Hughes, aide and close confidante of the President, objected when Press Secretary Ari Fleischer began to read from his initial draft, "This morning we were the victims of . . ." She offered a strong rebuttal: "Wait a minute—we aren't the victims of anything. We may have been targets, we may have been attacked, but we are not victims."⁶ Visibly shaken, Bush addressed the nation shortly after one o'clock that day, and he did not refer to the nation's citizens as victims.

Professor Michael A. Roberto and Research Associate Gina M. Carioggia prepared this case based on published sources. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.

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From Louisiana, the President flew to Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, where he conducted a videoconference with the members of the National Security Council (NSC) at 3:30 p.m. Bush told his advisers that the terrorists had carried out “attacks on freedom, and we’re going to define it as such.”⁷ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet informed the group that Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network appeared to be responsible.⁸ Bush concluded by reassuring his advisers, “We will find these people. They will pay. And I don’t want you to have any doubt about it.”⁹

At 4:30 p.m., Bush boarded Air Force One to return to the nation’s capital.¹⁰ He asked Hughes and chief speechwriter Michael Gerson to begin working on a brief address that he intended to deliver to the nation that evening. Gerson penned a powerful line for this speech: “This is not just an act of terrorism. This is an act of war.” Bush agreed with this characterization but decided to remove the line from the speech. He told Hughes that “our mission is reassurance.” Bush recalled his thinking: “I wanted to calm nerves. . . . I knew I had plenty of time to make warlike declarations [later].”¹¹

Though he sought to reassure the nation, the President also wanted to take a very strong stand regarding the nation’s response to terrorism. In the speech, Bush made a bold pronouncement: “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.” This committed the nation to potential confrontations with those nation-states that may have been involved in the terrorist attacks. The President’s foreign policy team had been discussing how to address state-sponsored terrorism for some time. However, Bush chose to declare his administration’s new policy during that evening’s speech without seeking input from Vice President Cheney or Secretary of State Colin Powell. He did solicit advice from Rice. They discussed the wording of the pronouncement as well as whether the timing was appropriate. When Bush asked for her opinion, she recommended its inclusion in the speech. Bush concurred.¹²

After addressing the nation from the Oval Office, Bush presided over the day’s second meeting of the NSC. He recalled the mood as “incredibly somber.”¹³ Later that night, Bush convened his first meeting of the War Cabinet, which consisted of a select group of senior administration officials.

Bush’s War Cabinet

The War Cabinet consisted of Bush, Cheney, Card, Powell, Rice, Tenet, and seven other senior officials: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller, Attorney General John Ashcroft, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Henry Shelton, Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. This group met secretly almost every day over the next few weeks. Many of these individuals had a great deal of experience in foreign policy and had worked with one another for years. In fact, five individuals (Cheney, Powell, Rice, Wolfowitz, and Armitage) had played a prominent role during the planning and execution of the Persian Gulf War in Bush’s father’s administration.¹⁴ (See **Exhibit 1** for the backgrounds of each group member.)

President George W. Bush

Bush graduated from Harvard Business School in 1975, and several decades later, he became the first MBA to serve as President of the United States. Bush preferred to lead by setting a broad direction and delegating responsibility to trusted subordinates. A newspaper column published during the election campaign described Bush’s leadership style: “Bush is a delegator who leans heavily on trusted advisers. . . . He chooses aides who are loyal and gives them a lot of room. . . . He sketches goals in broad brushstrokes and leaves the details to others.”¹⁵

Bush had no foreign policy experience prior to his election. Therefore, he assembled a highly qualified team and relied on it heavily for advice and counsel. Bush described his management philosophy: "I'm not afraid to surround myself with strong and competent people. I hope the American people realize that a good executive is one that understands how to recruit people and how to delegate, how to align authority and responsibility, how to hold people accountable for results."¹⁶ (For more of Bush's reflections on his leadership style, see **Exhibit 2**.)

Bush preferred to listen to the perspectives of various advisers and then make a decision and move forward. One official described his leadership after September 11: "There are so many issues on such wide ranges of areas that it's 'make a decision and what's the next topic,' no second-guessing. I think [his response to the attacks] has proven his management style, to trust advisers and make decisions and not have these endless debates, the Dead Poet Society approach."¹⁷ Among the War Cabinet members, Bush relied in particular on the advice of Cheney, Powell, Rice, and Rumsfeld.

Vice President Dick Cheney

Bush asked Cheney to serve as Vice President because of his wealth of experience as a former Secretary of Defense, Congressman, and White House Chief of Staff. Bush had a great deal of confidence in Cheney's judgment. Before making difficult decisions, he often asked others, "What does Dick think?"¹⁸ Cheney shunned the spotlight, preferring to work behind the scenes to influence policy. A former colleague described Cheney's style: "When he was chief of staff in the Ford White House, his Secret Service code name was 'Backseat.' He would be the first to say he's not the most fiery orator in the world. But when you've got a plane heading toward the White House and you have to pick one person from whom to seek advice, that person would be Dick Cheney."¹⁹ According to several administration officials, Cheney often provided his input to the President during private meetings rather than declaring his views during larger group discussions. He did, however, ask many tough questions during team meetings with the President and other advisers.²⁰

Cheney had a close working relationship with both Rumsfeld and Powell, having worked with each of them for years. Rumsfeld served as head of the Office of Economic Opportunity in the early 1970s, and he hired Cheney at that time. This launched Cheney's political career.²¹ Powell served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the first Bush administration, and he worked very closely with Cheney during the Persian Gulf War. Powell described their relationship: "Vice President Cheney and I went through a lot of tough times together when he was Secretary of Defense and I was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We got to know each other very well, and sometimes a smile or a grimace across the table is all that is necessary for us to communicate with each other."²²

Secretary of State Colin Powell

Powell had served the past four presidents as an adviser, military leader, and Cabinet member. Bush often spoke of his deep respect for Powell and described him as "a tower of integrity and common sense."²³ Many observers believed that he was Bush's first choice to be Vice President but that his family did not want to endure the scrutiny that came with a campaign for national office. (For more on Powell's leadership style, see **Exhibit 3**.)

When Bush selected Powell as his Secretary of State, he lauded the former general's judgment in foreign affairs. However, on September 10, 2001, *Time* magazine published an article, entitled "Odd Man Out," that questioned Powell's influence within the Bush administration. The authors wrote:

On the Bush team, Powell finds himself operating across a fault line. In shorthand, it is attitude. The differences within the Bush team are not about goals so much as about the manner of accomplishing them. Powell is a multilateralist; other Bush advisers are unilateralists. He's internationalist; they're America first. . . . He is often seen as the Administration's force of moderation, charged with checking its more extreme enthusiasms.²⁴

The authors went on to contrast Powell's role with the influence exercised by Rice:

Bush is said to admire and respect his Secretary of State. But when Bush doesn't know the issues, he falls back on personal relations. . . . That sweet spot is now occupied by Rice. She taught Bush his ABCs in foreign affairs in their pre-presidency tutorials. . . . Rice has cultivated an even higher profile, which by the zero-sum measurements of Washington implies a lower one for Powell.²⁵

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice

Rice grew up in Alabama during the 1950s. As an African-American, she attended segregated schools in her early years. Later, she earned a PhD in political science and became a professor. She served on the NSC during the first Bush administration and then became the provost of Stanford University. Colleagues described Rice as "soft-spoken" yet "tough, decisive, and unafraid of going against the grain."²⁶ Nevertheless, a former Stanford dean described her as a "terrific team player."²⁷ One person commented that "[Rice] has a gift for boiling things down to their essence and then describing the key issues in a clear, common-sensical way."²⁸ Treasury Secretary O'Neill remarked on Rice's role as a facilitator and moderator in meetings among Bush's advisers: "She will know when we're not going to agree. She'll say, 'Let's sharpen the debate, put it on paper, and let the boss decide.'"²⁹

Rice became acquainted with Bush during his father's administration, and she remained close to the Bush family throughout the 1990s.³⁰ One administration official described Rice's relationship with Bush: "Condi and the President are very close. They're friends. He trusts her. That means a lot."³¹ In fact, Rice visited Bush's ranch in Midland, Texas quite frequently, and she often watched movies and sports with the Bush family at the White House.³² They certainly shared a passion for sports; while Bush reportedly dreamt of becoming Commissioner of Major League Baseball in years past, Rice fantasized about serving as National Football League Commissioner.³³

Interestingly, Bush often asked Rice not to speak during War Cabinet meetings. He "wanted her to be a second, silent arbiter of the discussion . . . not to advance a position, but to act as an alternative set of eyes and ears, to check her gut against his in weighing the options."³⁴ However, a former Stanford colleague noted that "After a meeting is over . . . she always gets the last word. She's always the one still talking to the President."³⁵

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

Rumsfeld began his second stint as Secretary of Defense in January 2001, having also served in that post during the Ford administration in the 1970s. When Rumsfeld returned to the Defense Department, he set out to transform the military establishment, and as expected, he encountered a great deal of resistance. Rumsfeld believed that the nation faced an entirely new set of threats, far different from those that prevailed during the Cold War. Consequently, he believed that the military needed to develop new capabilities and procure different kinds of weapons.³⁶ After the attacks, a defense industry expert commented on this philosophy: "Rumsfeld was right. The threat really has

changed, and we weren't prepared—and he's been saying that from Day One."³⁷ Rumsfeld also believed that the U.S. had become too hesitant to employ its military might. He shared this philosophy with the President soon after taking office: "I left no doubt in [Bush's] mind that, at that moment where something happens, that I would be coming to him to lean forward, not back . . . and he said, unambiguously, that that is what he would be doing."³⁸

Rumsfeld not only had a clear vision for the Defense Department, he also espoused a distinct philosophy about management. He developed these views over many years as an executive in the private and public sectors. He articulated this philosophy in a set of reflections and quotations that became known as "Rumsfeld's Rules." He published the first edition in 1974 and released an updated version on September 10, 2001. (For excerpts from "Rumsfeld's Rules," see **Exhibit 4**.)

Deliberations Begin

Acts of War

On the day following the attacks, the administration began to change the tone of its message to the American people and the world community. The President offered these comments on Wednesday morning: "The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war. . . . This will be a monumental struggle between good and evil. But good will prevail."³⁹ Powell used very similar language during five appearances on television news programs that day.⁴⁰

On Wednesday, Bush and Powell began to assemble a broad coalition of world leaders who would support a campaign against terrorism. Bush spoke personally to the leaders of Great Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany.⁴¹ He consulted first with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, whom the President trusted to provide candid advice. Blair inquired about the timing of the nation's military response, knowing that many European leaders were worried about reckless retaliatory measures by the U.S.. Bush responded that he did not want to "pound sand with millions of dollars in weapons."⁴² He wanted to take time to plan an effective response. Blair agreed with this approach and advised Bush to move quickly to line up international support for a military campaign.⁴³

After speaking with Blair, the President met with the NSC, and he directed the Deputies Council to outline the administration's goals in a proposed war on terrorism. The council consisted of the number-two officials in a few key cabinet departments and agencies. Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley chaired the group, which began working on this task immediately.⁴⁴

The War Cabinet convened later that morning. Rumsfeld initiated a discussion about the scope of the war. He asked the group, "Do we focus on bin Laden or more broadly?" When discussing complex foreign policy issues, Rumsfeld often cited former President Eisenhower, who once said, "If a problem cannot be solved, enlarge it." In this case, Rumsfeld argued that the administration could not mount an adequate defense against terrorism if it chose to focus narrowly on the al Qaeda network. He believed that preventing future acts of terror would "require a sustained and broadly based effort . . . and it's not restricted to a single entity, state or non-state entity."⁴⁵

Powell responded to Rumsfeld's comments: "The goal is terrorism in its broadest sense, focusing first on the organization that acted yesterday." Cheney added, "To the extent we define our task broadly, including those who support terrorism, then we get at states. And it's easier to find them than it is to find bin Laden." After listening to the discussion for some time, the President interjected, "Start with bin Laden, which Americans expect. And then, if we succeed, we've struck a huge blow

and can move forward.” However, Bush remained concerned about his military options. He did not think the military was prepared to fight an unconventional war against a very different kind of enemy. Bush challenged Rumsfeld and Shelton to consider innovative ways to conduct this war.⁴⁶

The NSC met again later in the day. The Deputies Council argued that the war on terrorism should not consist only of military action. It advocated a comprehensive campaign including diplomatic, financial, investigative, and humanitarian efforts. The deputies proposed that the goal of the campaign should be to “eliminate terrorism as a threat to our way of life, including terrorist organizations, networks, finances and access to weapons of mass destruction.”⁴⁷ The deputies stressed that the objective should not be to end all terrorism, since this would be nearly impossible, but rather to eradicate direct threats to the United States. The President agreed with these principles but argued that the U.S. had an obligation to defend its allies as well.⁴⁸

Next, the group returned to the issue of the scope of the campaign. Bush reiterated his inclination to start with al Qaeda, and Powell agreed with him. However, Cheney inquired about taking action against states that support terrorism, particularly Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. Rumsfeld mentioned Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein, long rumored to be a sponsor of terrorist activity. Rumsfeld’s deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, strongly favored the removal of Hussein as leader of Iraq. Powell and Shelton expressed strong opposition to any moves against Iraq at that point, given the lack of direct evidence implicating Hussein in the September 11 attacks. The President listened attentively to all sides of the debate but chose to table the discussion for the time being.⁴⁹

Diplomacy and Disagreement

On Thursday, Powell announced publicly that bin Laden was the prime suspect in the U.S. investigation. He stressed that the U.S. would present a strong body of evidence indicating that bin Laden had planned the attacks. He also declared that the U.S. would move quickly to demand Pakistan’s cooperation in the effort to dismantle the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan.⁵⁰ Powell had advised Bush that he needed to move quickly to pressure Pakistan into siding with the U.S., despite that nation’s past support for the Taliban regime. Bush endorsed this approach and gave Powell wide latitude in dealing with the Pakistani government.⁵¹ On Thursday, Powell, Armitage, and Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain presented Pakistani leaders with a list of seven demands for cooperation in the war on terrorism.⁵² Pakistani leader Musharraf agreed to comply in all areas.⁵³

Meanwhile, the War Cabinet met again Thursday morning. CIA Director George Tenet presented a plan for attacking the terrorist network in Afghanistan through covert activity and military attacks. He recommended that the CIA and the U.S. military join forces with the Northern Alliance, a loose network of anti-Taliban resistance. Next, Cofer Black, head of the CIA counterterrorism center, gave a fiery presentation about how the U.S. could dismantle the al Qaeda network. At one point, he declared, “You give us the mission, we can get ‘em. They’ll all have flies on their eyeballs.”⁵⁴ His enthusiasm and seeming overconfidence made quite an impression.

After the meeting, Bush conducted a conference call with New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and New York Governor George Pataki. Then he answered a few questions from reporters. At one point, the President’s voice trembled, and he began to shed a few tears. He could not hold back his emotions after hearing about the devastation in New York.⁵⁵

Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz briefed the press that afternoon. He sparked controversy when he said, “It’s not just simply a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, removing support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism.”⁵⁶ Many took this to suggest administration support for action against countries such as Iraq. Wolfowitz had

been a vocal critic of the decision not to remove Hussein from power during the Gulf War, and he continued to press for the removal of the Iraqi dictator. This put him at odds with Powell, who had expressed hesitation about using military force to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1990 and later had strongly advocated not expanding the mission to include the eradication of Hussein's regime.⁵⁷ When asked about Wolfowitz's comments, Powell replied, "Ending terrorism is where I would like to leave it, and let Mr. Wolfowitz speak for himself."⁵⁸ Powell's frustration had been building for some time. When Rumsfeld and his deputy had mentioned Iraq during a prior War Cabinet discussion, Powell expressed his annoyance privately to General Shelton: "What the hell, what are these guys thinking about? Can't you get these guys back in the box?"⁵⁹

With many issues still unresolved, Bush became concerned that the War Cabinet had been unable to deliberate without interruption amid the chaos of recent days. Therefore, Bush invited his advisers to Camp David, the Presidential retreat in Maryland, for the weekend. He said, "Everything [should be] on the table. . . . I need options on the table. . . . I want decisions quick." Rumsfeld concurred, but added: "We owe you what can go wrong, things that can take wind out of our sails."⁶⁰

A National Day of Remembrance

Friday marked the National Day of Remembrance and included a speech by the President at Washington National Cathedral. Early that morning, Bush held his first full Cabinet meeting since the attacks. He became emotional as the group greeted him with a standing ovation. Powell became concerned that Bush might lose his composure again while speaking at the cathedral. He slipped him a note that read, "Dear Mr. President, what I do when I have to give a speech like this, I avoid those words I know will cause me to well up such as Mom and Pop."⁶¹ Everyone laughed when Bush told the others, "Let me tell you what the Secretary of State just told me. 'Dear Mr. President, don't break down!'" Bush reassured Powell, "Don't worry, I've got it out of my system."⁶² Next, Rumsfeld opened the meeting with a prayer in which he asked for "patience to measure our lust for action."⁶³

Bush called British Prime Minister Blair again after the Cabinet meeting. The two leaders discussed how to deal with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Blair argued that the President should issue the Taliban an ultimatum, demanding that the government eliminate the terrorist training camps and turn over bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders. The two men also talked about the challenges of constructing an effective international coalition in the campaign against terrorism.⁶⁴

During the midday speech at the cathedral, Bush spoke directly to the families of the victims, saying, "We offer the deepest sympathy of the nation. And I assure you, you are not alone." The President evoked memories of America's past efforts to defend democracy: "In every generation, the world has produced enemies of human freedom. They have attacked America, because we are freedom's home and defender. And the commitment of our fathers is now the calling of our time." He also expressed confidence that America would prevail when he declared, "This conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing."⁶⁵

After the speech, Congress passed a resolution approving the use of military force against the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks and the nations that harbored these groups. Meanwhile, Powell continued his coalition-building efforts, speaking to leaders from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria, and other nations.⁶⁶ The President proceeded to visit Ground Zero, the site where the twin towers of the World Trade Center once stood. He toured the area by helicopter along with Mayor Giuliani, and he spoke to the rescue workers from atop a section of the rubble. Bush thanked them for their dedication and perseverance, and he promised federal support for the cleanup and rebuilding efforts. While in New York, the President also met with the families of many victims. Then, he traveled to Camp David for the weekend gathering of his War Cabinet.⁶⁷

Camp David

Bush asked his advisers to gather without him for informal discussions at Camp David early Friday evening. The War Cabinet members, minus the President, ate dinner together and discussed many of the outstanding issues before them. Among other things, they talked about the unique aspects of the campaign ahead, drawing a number of distinctions between this war and the conventional conflict in the Persian Gulf a decade earlier.⁶⁸ The advisers seemed to appreciate the opportunity to discuss many complicated topics and questions in a more comfortable, informal environment. Many issues remained unresolved including precisely what type of military action to take in Afghanistan, how to deal with the Taliban, and whether to expand the campaign to confront other states that sponsored terrorism. As Bush arrived late that night, he thought about his objectives. By the end of the weekend, he hoped to have his team unified in support of a clear strategy for moving forward. He recalled thinking, "If everybody is not on the same page, then you're going to have people peeling off and second-guessing and the process will not, will really not unfold the way it should."⁶⁹

Discussing Afghanistan

On Saturday morning, the War Cabinet convened in a conference room with maps of Afghanistan and the surrounding region on the wall.⁷⁰ The schedule consisted of several presentations, with ample opportunity for unstructured discussion following each speaker. Powell began by discussing the efforts to build an international coalition, and Treasury Secretary O'Neill talked about how to impair al Qaeda's ability to finance terrorist activity. Next, CIA Director Tenet outlined a detailed proposal for an extensive array of covert activities in Afghanistan and other nations. He asked the President to authorize the CIA to increase its ties with foreign intelligence agencies, some of which employed brutal tactics carried out by disreputable characters. Tenet argued that CIA paramilitary teams should move into Afghanistan and establish ties with the Northern Alliance. Then, working with Special Forces troops, the CIA teams and the Northern Alliance would begin to wrestle control of northern regions of Afghanistan from the Taliban. This would deprive al Qaeda of its "safe haven" in that area. Tenet also argued for simultaneous covert operations in other countries. At the end, Bush expressed satisfaction with Tenet's detailed presentation. Rumsfeld too was pleased that Tenet had recommended the use of ground troops—a military option that he endorsed.⁷¹

Next, Mueller and Ashcroft discussed the investigation and the plan to craft new law enforcement legislation. Finally, General Shelton spoke. He appreciated that the President did not take the military for granted and that he was not relying on military action alone to address the terrorist threat.⁷² Shelton had formulated military strategies for attacking Afghanistan and Iraq but only presented the alternatives regarding the former. He outlined three options. First, the U.S. could launch cruise missiles at al Qaeda's training camps. The military could implement this plan very quickly. Second, the military could execute manned bomber attacks and cruise missile strikes. These forces would target the Taliban military as well as the al Qaeda camps. Third, the U.S. could launch an air campaign and insert ground troops, including Special Forces and regular army troops. This plan carried the most risk and would take the most time to implement.⁷³

As the morning progressed, the President listened attentively to everyone's ideas but rarely interjected his own views. Chief of Staff Card commented on Bush's role during the deliberations: "He had no preconceived bias that he was trying to ram down the group's throat. He was there to collect the facts, have them debated, collect strategies and have them debated—and then offer direction."⁷⁴ When the morning presentations ended, Bush asked his advisers to discuss the risks associated with these proposals and the worst-case scenario regarding military action in Afghanistan.

Many individuals expressed concern about a protracted war in Afghanistan, especially given the problems encountered by the Soviets during their invasion in the 1980s. Powell worried about losing international support if the U.S. expanded the campaign beyond al Qaeda. Bush replied, “At some point, we may be the only ones left [in the war on terrorism]. That’s okay with me. We are America.” Powell disagreed, believing that the U.S. should not move unilaterally. Cheney, however, concurred with the President.⁷⁵

Many advisers expressed concern that the war could spark unrest and conflict in Pakistan. Bush asked Powell if the Pakistani government understood the dangers of endorsing U.S. action in Afghanistan. After listening to Powell’s description of his discussions with the country’s leaders, the President asked his advisers to construct an aid program for Pakistan. The group also talked about how to deal with the Taliban. Bush asked the team whether the administration should establish a deadline for the Taliban to comply with a list of demands—an approach recommended by Tony Blair during his conversations with the President. The group appeared split on this issue. Bush mentioned that he wanted to establish clear consequences for the Taliban if it did not cooperate in the pursuit of al Qaeda terrorists, but he did not offer a definitive view on the deadline issue.⁷⁶

The Iraqi Question

At one point, Rice asked the group about the benefits and risks of expanding the war to other countries. This sparked a renewed debate about Iraq. Bush had tabled this discussion earlier in the week, but now he allowed the participants to restart the debate. Rumsfeld initiated the discussion, asking whether the U.S. should move now to address the threat posed by Hussein, who was believed to be funding terrorist activity and developing weapons of mass destruction.⁷⁷ The issue brought back memories of the deliberations prior to the Gulf War. Back then, Joint Chiefs Chairman Powell had argued for economic sanctions rather than rapid military action. Defense Secretary Cheney had argued for a broad military campaign to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait. One of his deputies, Wolfowitz, had supported him fervently. The elder President Bush had sided with Cheney and Wolfowitz. Later, however, he chose to stop the war without proceeding to Baghdad and ousting Hussein, a decision endorsed by Powell but unpopular with many other aides.⁷⁸

Now in 2001, Powell and Wolfowitz again stood on opposite sides of a debate about Iraq. In his opening comments, Rumsfeld appeared to be leaning toward support for military action against Hussein’s regime. Powell expressed his disagreement. He believed that the U.S. should move against Iraq only after building solid international support for such an action, as the President’s father had done during the Gulf War. Powell did not believe that the U.S. could muster such international support at this point, especially without firm evidence of Iraqi involvement in the attacks. Wolfowitz countered by arguing that Hussein represented a more severe threat than bin Laden. Evidence suggested that the Iraqis had been developing biological and chemical weapons and that Hussein had been trying to acquire nuclear capability. The Iraqi dictator also had expelled international weapons inspectors. The U.S. could not link Hussein to these terrorist attacks, but Wolfowitz pointed out that evidence indicated that Hussein was behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.⁷⁹

Wolfowitz pressed his arguments with determination during the discussions. However, Card believed that he became repetitive. One incident, in particular, irked Card and Bush. During a comment by Rumsfeld on the Iraqi issue, Wolfowitz interjected to reiterate one of his arguments for why the U.S. should move now against Hussein. Participants were unsure whether Rumsfeld was upset with Wolfowitz’s interruption. Later, Card told Rumsfeld and his top deputy, “The President will expect one person to speak for the Department of Defense.”⁸⁰

Bush did not express an opinion on the Iraqi issue during this heated debate. Later, he recalled his thinking: “My theory is you’ve got to do something and do it well. . . . If we tried to do too many things . . . then the lack of focus would have been a huge risk.”⁸¹ Bush also worried that people’s involvement in the Gulf War decision-making process may have colored their interpretation of the current situation. He has said, “One of the things that I wasn’t going to allow to happen is that we weren’t going to let their previous experience in this theater dictate a rational course for a new war.”⁸²

After hours of discussion, President Bush adjourned the meeting and asked everyone to return in a few hours. He made it clear that he expected to hear their recommendations after the break. Rice did not feel comfortable with the meandering, unstructured flow of the discussion during the morning session. She worried about the lack of progress on key issues. Rice shared her concerns with a few others, but not with the President. She stressed to them that Bush expected a plan of action to emerge from the Camp David deliberations. Approximately fifteen minutes before the War Cabinet meetings were to resume, Rice encountered Bush returning from his workout. He proposed a format for the afternoon meeting in which he would systematically move around the room asking each adviser to state his recommendations for a future course of action. He asked for Rice’s opinion. She replied, “That’s fine. Do you want me to just listen?” Bush confirmed, “I want you to listen.”⁸³

Final Arguments

When discussions resumed, President Bush asked Powell, Rumsfeld, Tenet, Card, and Cheney to state their recommendations for military action. Powell began by arguing that the international community would support action focused on those directly responsible for the terrorist attack. Other nations would view an attack on Iraq as ill-timed and unjustified, despite widespread concerns about Iraq’s past support for other terrorist activity. Moreover, the U.S. military would be less effective if it attempted to fight multiple battles simultaneously. Powell argued for a single-minded focus on al Qaeda, and he recommended the issuance of an ultimatum to the Taliban. If it did not comply, he advocated the use of overwhelming force against Afghanistan’s armed forces.⁸⁴

Rumsfeld followed Powell, and he emphasized patience. He wanted time to plan an effective and aggressive military operation rather than rushing to retaliate in the next few days. He stressed the need to take actions now with an eye toward their long-term global impact. Rumsfeld recommended the use of ground troops, particularly Special Forces personnel. He emphasized, however, that this war would require unconventional tactics. Rumsfeld did not discuss the Iraqi issue in his remarks.⁸⁵

Tenet stressed the need to focus on Afghanistan in the near term, but he also suggested the immediate initiation of covert action in other nations to damage the al Qaeda network and other terrorist cells. He argued for an unprecedented level of collaboration between the CIA and the U.S. military on the ground in Afghanistan. His plan called for establishing a beachhead in northern Afghanistan, from which the U.S. could pursue al Qaeda and topple the Taliban if necessary.⁸⁶

Card offered several probing questions before moving to his recommendations. He sparked lively discussion by asking, “What is the definition of success?”⁸⁷ Later, he argued that the U.S. military action needed to be high impact, rather than a limited attempt at retaliation from afar, such as by cruise missiles alone. Card also recommended aggressive covert operations in other parts of the world. Card argued against a near-term attack on Hussein.

Finally, Cheney offered his views. He recommended a multifaceted campaign against al Qaeda including an attack on its financial assets as well as its training camps in Afghanistan. Cheney believed that the U.S. needed to move against the Taliban, too, and he suggested working with the Northern Alliance, given their knowledge of the local terrain and Taliban defenses. Cheney argued

that the administration needed to be prepared to employ ground troops and incur casualties as a result. He stressed the importance of building a strong international coalition, and for that reason, he recommended no action against Iraq in the short term. However, Cheney made it clear that he was worried about Hussein's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. The group discussed the recommendations offered by Cheney and the others. Everyone agreed that this campaign would not end quickly and that they needed to be prepared for a long war.⁸⁸ Ultimately, Bush announced, "I'm going to think about it, and I'll let you know what I've decided."⁸⁹ The group disbanded, with some members returning to the capital while others remained at Camp David for the evening.

Afterward, news reports discussed some of the sharp differences of opinion among Bush's advisers, and journalists speculated about the relationship between Rumsfeld and Powell in particular. They focused on the fact that Rumsfeld tended to be more "hawkish" while Powell often argued for caution and restraint. The two men acknowledged differences of opinion, but suggested that they always found a way to work together constructively. Powell said, "We argue, but we almost always find the answer. We have political views. I am considered moderate. But everyone knows where everyone else is coming from."⁹⁰ Rumsfeld commented on the President's approach to the disagreements among his advisers, "Everything doesn't have to be pre-chewed like baby food before it comes to him."⁹¹ When asked about disputes among key advisers, Rice did not deny that differences of opinion existed. However, she stressed that the President did not want debates to spill over into the newspapers. She described Bush's views on the matter: "The president is not someone who's willing to put up with problems for the sake of ego. That's just understood."⁹²

The President Decides

On Sunday morning, the President conferred with Cheney and Rice in two separate meetings. Cheney and Bush discussed the issues that had been debated by the War Cabinet. Neither Bush nor Cheney have offered additional insights regarding this private conversation.⁹³ Later, Bush asked Rice to join him in his cabin at Camp David. He told Rice that he had considered everyone's views and come to a series of conclusions. He described how he wanted to proceed in the war effort. Rice and Bush also have chosen not to discuss the content of this private conversation and have not commented on the extent to which Rice suggested revisions or additions to Bush's plan of action.⁹⁴

In the afternoon, Bush met with his communications team and asked it to begin thinking about how to shape the administration's message on the war. He emphasized that he wanted no leaks to the press regarding military plans. At this point, he did not explain the detailed military strategy that he planned to pursue in Afghanistan.⁹⁵ After this meeting, Bush again met privately with Rice to discuss what he wanted to announce to the War Cabinet the next day. Rice took copious notes and then drafted a one-page memo that described the key aspects of the President's strategy.⁹⁶

Moving Forward

The War Cabinet met again on Monday morning. Bush began by informing the group that he had made a series of choices after listening to its input and advice over the weekend. While outlining his plan, Bush delegated implementation steps to each of his advisers. He told the team that he wanted a multidimensional war effort, including financial, legal, diplomatic, and covert action as well as the use of military force. Bush told Powell that he wanted to issue an immediate ultimatum to the Taliban, demanding that it comply with a series of demands including the capture of bin Laden and his top associates. He wanted Powell to make it clear that the consequences of noncompliance would include a rapid and powerful military attack by U.S. forces.⁹⁷

Bush explained that he would issue a presidential order providing the CIA with the ability to begin a series of covert operations around the world. He wanted CIA paramilitary teams to move within days to team up with the Northern Alliance on the ground in Afghanistan. With regard to the military mission, Bush chose the third option, presented by General Shelton. This involved an extensive air campaign, cruise missile attacks, and troops on the ground. The President said that he understood the risks of employing ground troops in Afghanistan, particularly given the mountainous terrain, the presence of rival warlords in various regions, and the history of unsuccessful foreign invasions in that country. However, he felt that the U.S. needed to act with decisive force, and he did not believe that it could dismantle al Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power with air force alone. Bush also said that he wanted the Pentagon to involve Allied forces, particularly the British, in its war plans. Finally, Bush told the team that he had decided not to move against Hussein at that point, though he directed the team to continue developing plans for overthrowing the Iraqi dictator.⁹⁸

Some discussion ensued after Bush finished describing his chosen course of action. In particular, Powell remarked that he would like a bit more time to develop the ultimatum to be issued to the Taliban. He suggested that they wait until the next day. The President agreed to hold off until Tuesday morning if necessary, although he emphasized that he wanted no further delays. The team also spent a considerable amount of time discussing how the U.S. should proceed after the initial wave of attacks, depending on what transpired during the first phase of military action.⁹⁹

Later that morning, the President told his communications team that he wanted to deliver a speech regarding his war plans to a joint session of Congress in a few days. He directed the speechwriters to complete an initial draft by seven o'clock that evening. Bush told Karen Hughes, "This is a defining moment. We have to get it right."¹⁰⁰ By the time Bush addressed the nation three days later, he and his speechwriters had revised the speech 19 times.¹⁰¹

On Tuesday, Rice gave the President a draft of the ultimatum developed by Powell and other advisers. At that point, Bush decided to deliver the ultimatum during his speech, rather than having Powell convey the message through diplomatic channels.¹⁰² On Wednesday, Bush met with a group of speechwriters and advisers. NSC Deputy Hadley suggested a slight change in the declaration of the so-called Bush Doctrine: "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." He proposed the addition of the word "continue" so that the policy would state, ". . . and those who continue to harbor them." He believed that the original statement implied confrontation with many nations. He wanted to provide countries with an opportunity to support the current U.S. effort despite past transgressions.¹⁰³ Later, the War Cabinet convened and discussed the speech. Rumsfeld argued against mentioning bin Laden by name. He wanted to describe the war effort in broader terms. Rice disagreed, and ultimately, Bush decided to keep one reference to bin Laden in his address. The group also debated Hadley's recommendation. Rice and Powell expressed strong support for this proposal, and Bush chose to heed their advice.¹⁰⁴

On Thursday, September 20, President Bush delivered a nationally televised address. (For excerpts from the speech, see **Exhibit 5**.) Bush put the finishing touches on his address that afternoon. Then he met with Blair, whom he had invited to attend the speech as a demonstration of their two nations' solidarity in the campaign against terrorism. Bush and Blair talked about military collaboration in Afghanistan and their ongoing coalition-building efforts. Finally, at nine o'clock that evening, Bush addressed the nation. During the speech, Bush described the scope of the war:

Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen. . . . We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. . . . From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.¹⁰⁵

Exhibit 1 The Bush War Cabinet

President George W. Bush

Born in 1946, Bush grew up in Texas and attended Yale. Later, he earned an MBA from Harvard Business School. After graduation, he worked in the oil and gas industry. In 1989 Bush became the managing general partner of the Texas Rangers baseball team. He was elected Governor of Texas in 1994 and won re-election four years later. He became President of the United States in 2001.

Vice President Richard Cheney

Cheney was born in 1941 and grew up in Casper, Wyoming. He began his career in government during the Nixon administration and became White House Chief of Staff during the Ford administration. Beginning in 1977, Cheney served five terms in the House of Representatives. During the first Bush administration, he served as Secretary of Defense. He was appointed CEO of Halliburton, an energy services firm, in 1995. Cheney became Vice President in 2001.

Secretary of State Colin Powell

Powell was born in New York City in 1937. He graduated from City College of New York in 1958 and became an officer in the U.S. Army. Powell spent 35 years in the military. In 1987, President Reagan appointed him National Security Adviser. Powell then served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1989-1993. Powell became Secretary of State in 2001.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

Born in 1932, Rumsfeld graduated from Princeton and served for three years in the U.S. Navy. He was elected to four terms in Congress during the 1960s, joined the Nixon administration in 1969, and later became Ambassador to NATO. Rumsfeld served as Chief of Staff and Secretary of Defense for President Ford. In 1977, he was appointed CEO of G.D. Searle. He later became CEO of General Instrument and Chairman of Gilead Sciences. He began his second stint as Defense Secretary in 2001.

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice

Rice was born in 1954 in Birmingham, Alabama. She studied at the University of Denver and Notre Dame, and she joined the faculty at Stanford University in 1981 as a professor of political science. She served as an adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1980s and became a member of the National Security Council during the first Bush administration. From 1993-1999, Rice served as Provost at Stanford. She was named President George W. Bush's National Security Adviser in 2001.

Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Jr.

Card was born in 1947 and grew up in Holbrook, Massachusetts. He earned a bachelor's degree from the University of South Carolina. From 1975-1983, Card served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives. He then worked in various roles for President Reagan. During the first Bush administration, he served as Deputy Chief of Staff and Secretary of Transportation. After several years in the private sector, Card returned to the public sector in 2001 as White House Chief of Staff.

CIA Director George Tenet

Born in 1937, Tenet grew up in Queens, New York, and earned degrees from Columbia and Georgetown. Tenet worked on intelligence issues as an aide to Senators Heinz and Leahy during the 1980s. President Clinton appointed him to the National Security Council and later named him Director of the CIA. President Bush chose to retain Tenet as CIA Director when he took office.

Exhibit 1 (continued)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton

Shelton was born in North Carolina in 1942. He earned degrees from North Carolina State and Auburn University. He became an officer in the U.S. Army in 1963 and served in the armed forces until his retirement at the end of 2001. He served as an Assistant Division Commander for Operations during the Gulf War. In 1996, Shelton became Commander in Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command. President Clinton named him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1997.

Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill

O'Neill was born in Missouri in 1935. He earned degrees from Fresno State and Indiana University. O'Neill worked in the U.S. Veterans Administration and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) during the 1960s. In the Ford administration, he served as Deputy Director of the OMB. O'Neill moved to the private sector in the late 1970s and rose to become President of International Paper in 1985. He joined Alcoa in 1987 and served as CEO until joining the Bush administration.

Attorney General John Ashcroft

Born in 1942, Ashcroft grew up in Missouri, graduated from Yale, and earned a J.D. from the University of Chicago in 1967. He was elected to two terms as Missouri's Attorney General in the 1970s. Ashcroft then served two terms as Governor of Missouri and one term as a member of the U.S. Senate. He became Attorney General of the United States in 2001.

FBI Director Robert Mueller, III

Mueller was born in 1944. He earned degrees from Princeton University, New York University, and the University of Virginia Law School. Mueller served as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps for three years. From 1973-1976, Mueller practiced law in San Francisco. Mueller worked as a federal prosecutor from 1977-1990. During the first Bush administration, he served as an Assistant Attorney General. He worked in private practice for a few years before returning to the U.S. Attorney's office in 1995, where he served until President George W. Bush appointed him Director of the FBI.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz

Wolfowitz was born in 1943. He earned a bachelor's degree from Cornell and a doctorate from the University of Chicago. He first worked in the Defense Department during the Carter administration. President Reagan appointed him first as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Pacific Affairs and later as Ambassador to Indonesia. From 1989-1993, Wolfowitz served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He became Dean of the Nitzke School of International Studies at Johns Hopkins in 1994 and served in that capacity until becoming Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2001.

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage

Armitage was born in 1945. He attended the U.S. Naval Academy and served several tours of duty in Vietnam. He worked in the Defense Department during the Reagan administration and then was appointed to a variety of foreign policy positions by the first President Bush. He returned to the federal government in 2001 when he was appointed Deputy Secretary of State.

Source: Adapted by casewriter from Web pages of the Cabinet departments of the U.S. federal government.

Exhibit 2 George Bush's Leadership Style

In his autobiography, *A Charge to Keep: My Journey to the White House*, George W. Bush reflected on his approach to leadership. He has said that his views on managing government reflect the lessons that he learned as an executive in major league baseball and the oil industry. The following excerpts from the book provide some insight regarding Bush's leadership style and management philosophy. Note that he was serving as Governor of Texas at the time that he wrote this book; therefore, the quotations refer to how he managed that administration.

"The first challenge of leadership, I believe, is to outline a clear vision and agenda. . . . The next challenge was to build a strong team of effective people to implement my agenda. I worked hard to recruit the very best."

"I put a lot of faith and trust in my staff. I look for people who are smart and loyal and who share my conservative philosophy. My job is to set the agenda and tone and framework, to lay out the principles by which we operate and make decisions, and then delegate much of the process to them. The final decision often rests with me, but their judgment has a big influence."

"I had decided that I wanted a flat organizational chart rather than the traditional chief-of-staff approach; I wanted the senior managers of different divisions in my office to report directly to me, instead of working through a chief of staff. I like to get information from a lot of different people, plus I knew that high-powered people would be frustrated unless they had direct access to the boss."

"What I want from my staff is thorough research and unvarnished opinion. I don't want them to tell me what they think I want to hear; I try to create an atmosphere where they feel comfortable expressing their ideas and opinions. . . . I'll frequently stop, go around the room, and ask different individuals what they think and why."

"I don't like pre-programmed meetings. When state agency directors come in to brief me on a subject, they sometimes bring prepared notebooks and try to flip through them, reading out loud, page by page. I've usually already read the briefing books. I've been known to ask the directors to close the book and tell me in their own words what is really important, what they recommend and why."

"I want members of my staff to know I think about what they say. It's important to listen, and I often call to follow up or ask about something someone said in a conversation. I do like people to make their points and express their opinions directly and concisely. . . . I read a lot of memos, but I enjoy the give-and-take that comes with substantive discussion. I want to probe logic, ask questions and test ideas by talking about them."

"I am a strong advocate of accountability. I believe in results. After all, I ran a baseball team. The box scores are delivered in the driveway every morning, for everyone to read. Wins and losses are right there in black and white."

Source: Adapted by casewriter from George W. Bush's autobiography, *A Charge to Keep: My Journey to the White House* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1999).

Exhibit 3 Colin Powell's Lessons on Leadership

Quotations by Colin Powell on the principles of effective leadership:

1. "Leadership is the art of accomplishing more than the science of management says is possible."
2. "Being responsible sometimes means pissing people off."
3. "The day soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you have stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help them or concluded that you do not care. Either is a failure of leadership."
4. "Don't be buffaloeed by experts and elites. Experts often possess more data than judgment. Elites can become so inbred that they produce hemophiliacs who bleed to death . . . [if] nicked by the real world."
5. "Don't be afraid to challenge the pros, even in their own backyard."
6. "Never neglect details. When everyone's mind is dulled . . . the leader must be doubly vigilant."
7. "You don't know what you can get away with until you try."
8. "Keep looking below surface appearances . . . [even though] you might not like what you find."
9. "Organization doesn't really accomplish anything. Plans don't accomplish anything, either. Theories of management don't much matter. Endeavors succeed or fail because of the people involved. Only by attracting the best people will you accomplish great deeds."
10. "Organization charts and fancy titles count for next to nothing."
11. "Never let your ego get so close to your position that when your position goes, your ego goes with it."
12. "Fit no stereotypes. Don't chase the latest management fads. The situation dictates which approach best accomplishes the team's mission."
13. "Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier."
14. "'Powell's Rules for Picking People'—Look for intelligence and judgment and, most critically, a capacity to anticipate, to see around corners. Also look for loyalty, integrity, a high energy drive, a balanced ego and the drive to get things done."
15. "Great leaders are almost always great simplifiers who can cut through argument, debate and doubt, to offer a solution everybody can understand."
16. "Use the formula P= 40 to 70, in which P stands for the probability of success and the numbers indicate the percentage of information acquired. Once the information is in the 40 to 70 range, go with your gut."
17. "The commander in the field is always right and the rear echelon is wrong, unless proven otherwise."
18. "Have fun in your command. Don't always run at a breakneck pace. . . . Surround yourself with people who take their work seriously, but not themselves, those who work hard and play hard!"

Source: Adapted by casewriter from Oren Harari, *The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002).

Exhibit 4 Selected Excerpts from “Rumsfeld’s Rules”

Serving in the White House

- “Don’t accept the post or stay unless you have an understanding with the President that you’re free to tell him what you think ‘with the bark off’ and you have the courage to do it.”
- “Learn to say ‘I don’t know.’ If used when appropriate, it will be often.”
- “In our system leadership is by consent, not command. To lead a President must persuade. Personal contacts and experiences help shape his thinking. They can be critical to his persuasiveness and thus to his leadership.”
- “Preserve the President’s options. He may need them.”
- “Don’t automatically obey Presidential directives if you disagree or if you suspect he hasn’t considered key aspects of the issue.”
- “The price of being close to the President is delivering bad news. You fail him if you don’t tell him the truth. Others won’t do it.”

Doing the Job in the White House

- “A President needs multiple sources of information. Avoid excessively restricting the flow of paper, people, or ideas to the President, though you must watch his time. If you over-control, it will be your ‘regulator’ that controls, not his. Only by opening the spigot fairly wide, risking that some of his time may be wasted, can his ‘regulator’ take control.”
- “See that the President, the Cabinet and staff are informed. If cut out of the information flow, their decisions may be poor, not made, or not confidently or persuasively implemented.”
- “Don’t allow people to be excluded from a meeting or denied an opportunity to express their views because their views differ from the President’s, the person who calls the meeting, or your views. The staff system must have integrity and discipline.”
- “When the President is faced with a decision, be sure he has the recommendations of all appropriate people, or that he realizes he does not have their views and is willing to accept the consequence. They will be out of sync, unhappy and less effective if they feel they are or are seen as having been ‘cut out.’”
- “One of your tasks is to separate the ‘personal’ from the ‘substantive.’ The two can become confused, especially if someone rubs the President wrong.”
- “If a prospective Presidential approach can’t be explained clearly enough to be understood well, it probably hasn’t been thought through well enough. If not well understood by the American people, it probably won’t ‘sail’ anyway. Send it back for further thought.”
- “Look for what’s missing. Many advisors can tell a President how to improve what’s proposed or what’s gone amiss. Few are able to see what isn’t there.”

Exhibit 4 (continued)

For the Secretary of Defense

- “Manage the interaction between the Pentagon and the White House. Unless you establish a narrow channel for the flow of information and ‘tasking’ back and forth, the process can quickly become chaotic.”
- “If you get the objectives right, a lieutenant can write the strategy.” (General George Marshall)

On Life (and other things)

- “Persuasion is a two-edged sword—reason and emotion—plunge it deep.” (Professor Lewis Sarett, Sr.)
- “The art of listening is indispensable for the right use of the mind. It is also the most gracious, the most open and the most generous of human habits.” (Attributed to R. Barr, St. John’s College, Annapolis, MD.)
- “In unanimity there may well be either cowardice or uncritical thinking.” (Unknown)
- “The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.” (F. Scott Fitzgerald)
- “If you develop rules, never have more than ten.”

Source: Adapted by casewriter from “Rumsfeld’s Rules,” revised September 10, 2001, copyright 1980 by Donald Rumsfeld.

Exhibit 5 Selected Excerpts from President Bush's Speech—September 20, 2001

"Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done."

"On September 11, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known casualties of war—but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack."

"The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. . . . This group and its leader—a person named Osama bin Laden—are linked to many other organizations in different countries. . . . There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror."

"Tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate."

"Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."

"Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network."

"This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat."

"This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom."

"Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom—the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time—now depends on us. . . . We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail."

Source: "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People" <www.whitehouse.gov>, September 20, 2001.

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